Frank v. Linkner (2017)
Members brought action against other members in limited liability company (LLC), asserting claims for LLC member oppression, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty after LLC sold substantially all of its assets, and members received nothing for their common shares. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the three-year limitation period for actions seeking an award of damages for improper conduct by managers or members constituted a “statute of limitations,” not a statute of repose; (2) the cause of action accrued when the LLC manager substantially interfered with members’ interests; and (3) the action accrued when the LLC amended its operating agreement, rather than when it sold substantially all assets. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.
Madugula v. Taub (2014)
Minority shareholder of corporation brought action against majority shareholder and corporation, alleging violations of the shareholder oppression provision of the Business Corporation Act (BCA). The Supreme Court held that: (1) there was no statutory right to a jury trial for claims under the shareholder oppression provision; (2) there was no state constitutional right to a jury trial for such claims; and (3) violations of shareholder agreements could constitute evidence of oppression under the BCA. Reversed and remanded.
Mize v. Tedford (2009)
A city did not fail to supervise a police officer who allegedly raped a victim while on duty, and thus was not subject to § 1983 liability. The victim only identified one prior sexual assault complaint against the officer’s unit, which was not against the officer and which the complainant did not pursue, and there had been only four total sexual assault complaints against the city’s police department in the past twenty years. Those undisputed facts could not establish a constitutionally deficient failure to supervise, and the victim could not show the required widespread pattern of constitutional violations to establish that the city’s actions or inactions amounted to a deliberate indifference to the danger of the officer sexually assaulting the victim.
Hastings Mut. Ins. Co. v. Safety King, Inc. (2009)
The Court of Appeals held that a fact issue as to whether antimicrobial pesticide contained in the sanitizing agent used by insured was a pollutant under the terms of the pollution exclusion clause precluded summary disposition, and that not all pesticides were necessarily pollutants under the pollution exclusion clause. Reversed and remanded.
Greenwood v. Raznick (2009)
Corporate employee brought action to recover for alleged breach of terms of employment agreement, and his employer defended based on broadly worded release provision included in the unexecuted subscription agreement pursuant to which employee allegedly received his stock in corporation. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that genuine issues of material fact as to how corporate employee received his stock in corporation, whether pursuant to terms of subscription agreement which he subsequently refused to execute or in partial compensation for his services, precluded summary judgment for employer, on estoppel theory, based on broadly worded release provision included in the subscription agreement.
Needa Parts Mfg., Inc. v. PSNET, Inc. (2009)
Aftermarket parts manufacturer brought state court action against investors for breach of stock purchase agreement, fraud, innocent misrepresentation, and tortious interference with business relationships. Defendants obtained removal and counterclaimed for tortious interference, fraud, and breach of contract. Parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Holdings: The District Court held that: (1) fact issue precluded summary judgment on manufacturer’s breach of contract claim; (2) fact issue precluded summary judgment on manufacturer’s alter ego claim; (3) investors did not plead fraud with particularity; (4) fact issues precluded summary judgment on manufacturer’s fraud claims; (5) manufacturer’s vague and conclusory allegations were insufficient to state claim for tortious interference; and (6) CEO’s alleged conduct in Michigan subjected him to personal jurisdiction in Michigan. Motions granted in part and denied in part.
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good (2008)
Cigarette smokers sued tobacco products manufacturer, alleging that manufacturer’s claims that product was “light” and had “lowered tar and nicotine” were misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA). The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment for manufacturer, ruling that the MUTPA claim was preempted by Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA). The United States Supreme Court held that: (1) action was not expressly preempted by FCLAA, abrogating Brown v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 479 F.3d 383; and (2) action was not implicitly preempted by Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) alleged longstanding policy regarding “light” cigarettes.
Hill v. City of Warren (2008)
Under MCR 2.604(A), a trial court has the power to revisit its prior rulings unless it has entered a final judgment that adjudicates all the claims, rights, and liabilities of the parties. Because plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification within 91 days of filing their class-action complaint, the trial court did not err in reconsidering its prior denial of class certification, as no final judgment had been entered.
B&H Medical, LLC v. ABP Administration, Inc. (2008)
Supplier of durable medical equipment (DME) and prosthetics and orthotics (P & O), and former member, brought action under Sherman Act against administrator of closed network of suppliers of DME and P & O to enrollees in certain health-benefits plans that health insurer had offered to employees and retirees of three large employers alleging that support contract amounted to illegal exclusive-dealing arrangement, constituted refusal to deal with and boycott of former member, and attempt to monopolize DME/P & O market. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held, among other things, that: competition as a whole had to suffer as result of closed network for order for excluded supplier, who lost anticipated income, to have antitrust standing; and a closed network did not have substantial share of relevant market.
Van Eman v. CARS Protection Plus (2007)
In this case arising under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, defendant appealed as of right a judgment awarding plaintiff damages and attorney’s fees, and entering a permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded for entry of an award of appellate attorney’s fees in favor of plaintiff.
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